But in the case of both Africa and Latin America , the hour is late , the world is moving fast , our role and our position have changed , and I do think it is vitally important in those areas and in other areas that we precede events ; that we do not move after them . In other words , I do not like to see the United States offer assistance to Latin America as a result of difficulties in Cuba . I would like to see us offer the hand of friendship to Latin America because of a traditional conviction that the United States can not maintain its freedom unless Latin America is a strong and viable and growing hemisphere .

I want to say , in all fairness , he 's taken back all three of these things He says he now supports the President on Quemoy and Matsu . He said he did n't really mean the President did the wrong thing in Paris , and he says : All along I did n't mean what everybody thought I meant about Cuba . I really meant what the President said - we want to give moral support to the cause of freedom .

It would , as we have seen from the immediate response of shock and dismay in Latin America , alienate every one of our sister American Republics whose friendship you have acknowledged is of vital importance to our efforts against communism . 3. It would give Mr. Khrushchev a valid excuse to intervene in Cuba on the side of the Castro government , saying that the United States had intervened in violation of its treaty obligations in trying to overthrow the existing government . 4. If this happened , your policy could lead to World War III .

I think I should prefer to answer it in this way , the only responsible way . As President Eisenhower has indicated time and time again , the United States can not tolerate Russian influence or a Russian-dominated government in Cuba or in the Americas . Now the President has made that clear .

So , here are two instances . And then we have the instance of Cuba , an instance again where the intentions were good , but where , because of lack of knowledge , apparently , or understanding , he made a suggestion which has rocked the capitals of the world . It has dismayed our friends .

Actually , the United States has given more assistance to Yugoslavia since the end of World War II than it has to all of Latin America combined . It is an unfortunate fact that the assistance which was proposed at the time of the Bogota Conference really represented assistance which the United States was determined to give Latin America only when our relations with Cuba soured to the point where we broke off the sugar quota . I think it would have been far wiser for the United States to have held out the hand of friendship 6 , 7 , or 8 years , to help to provide a long-term loan [applause] to help provide specifically long-term loans for their capital improvements .

The President was right , right because no President can ever apologize for defending the security of the United States against surprise attack . And then , my friends , the third point you will recall if you heard our last debate , was on Cuba where he said the President was n't going far enough , and where he , in effect , advocated policies that were universally interpreted as meaning intervention in the affairs of Cuba . And what would that have meant ? It would have invited the very kind of intervention from abroad that could have brought war to this hemisphere and to the world .

Talk about the situation , for example , in Cuba . Does Mr. Khrushchev gain prestige because he shoots down hundreds of thousands of people in the streets of Budapest in Hungary ? And does President Eisenhower lose prestige for America because he does not use our great power as he could against Mr. Castro in Cuba and the Cuban people ? But he works with other American States in developing the opinions which will keep the Cuban people on our side when eventually they get the right to choose the kind of government they want to . No; we gain ; they do n't .

He was wrong . On the basis of his visit to Cuba , he praised the competence and stability of the Batista dictatorship , and said communism could never take over in that island . He was wrong .

I have never advocated and I do not now advocate intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obligations and in fact stated in Johnstown , Pa. , that whatever we did with regard to Cuba should be within the confines of international law . What I have advocated is that we use all available commuuications - radio , television , and the press - and the moral power of the American Government - to let the forces of freedom in Cuba know that we believe that freedom will again rise in their country .

For America can not afford to continue to waste her resources and the skills of her people . The implacable Communist drive toward world domination now reaches to within 90 miles of our shores - on the once - friendly island of Cuba - and communism is on the march in Asia , and Africa and the Near East . In the face of such power and determination we can not afford to falter or lag behind .

The Associated Press this month featured an excellent survey by Relman Morin entitled U.S. Prestige Is Damaged in Asia - citing our image in that continent as that of a well-meaning but confused and confusing giant . To the Asian , this report said , the administration 's policy on Cuba was a clear case of American indecision , fumbling , and possible weakness . The events of last summer , the survey reported - the U-2 , summit , and Toyko chain of events - appear to have shown that the United States was weak , indecisive , incapable of evaluating trends , anticipating developments and formulating action to meet them .

I realize that line is subject to criticism , because we have a very difficult situation ; but to those who do criticize what we are doing my answer , of course , is : What is the alternative ? There are those who say , Why do n't we send Marines to Cuba ? We could do it and we could give it to Mr. Castro in 24 hours , but getting rid of Castro in Cuba would not get rid of Castroism in Cuba or in Latin America and it would set in motion , in my opinion , a chain reaction of opposition to the United States through the other Latin American countries , which could be very , very detrimental to our foreign policy . That 's why I think the United States , with its great power , has to continue to treat Cuba , as it has , with consideration , always patient , working with our other friends in Latin America , to be sure that they will support our position toward Castro and toward his close association with communism in Cuba . I would add one other thing ; I think that Mr. Castro 's very close identification with Mr. Khrushchev at the U.N. will not help him in Cuba .

But is n't it a somber fact that this administration has had less than 100 people working in the entire National Government on the subject of disarmament One-fifth as many as work for the U.S. Battle Monuments Commission are working on disarmament in this administration - 100 people scattered throughout the international government . And we can not avoid the menace of a Communist base on Cuba , only 90 miles from our shores , merely by wishing it had not happened , though I wish it had not . I wish this administration had been as alert to that as they now say they were .

They 're going to stir up trouble . We 're going to have trouble not only in Cuba but in Japan and all over the world . Why ? Because they 're going to stir them up .

As a matter of fact , this talk about the fact that Cuba is lost and that Ghana is lost , and Guinea is lost , incidentally - and they have also claimed that - is irresponsible in the extreme . Cuba is not lost . The fact that Castro , of course , is following a pro-Communist line at the present time causes us great concern , but there are plenty of things that we can do and are doing , and we 're taking some very firm steps , as you know , to quarantine Castro in that area .

We could have tried to inject ourselves into the Congo without honoring our commitments to the United Nations charter , just as Khrushchev seems to be trying to do . We could have turned Cuba into a second Hungary . But we can be eternally grateful that we have a man in the White House who did none of these things .

Because , if any President - let 's assume Mr. Kennedy had been President had apologized to Mr. Khrushchev , Khrushchev , would have beaten him to a pulp , and we ca n't have a President doing that with Khrushchev or anybody else . And then in Cuba - again shooting from the hip - advocating a policy that would have broken our treaties , cost us our friends , gotten us probably , probably certainly , into war . Of course , his defenders say he did n't mean it .

He has had an opportunity to study the long-range needs of each area - to recommend new policies for the administration - and to see that those recommendations are properly carried out . What has been the result ? Today , in six key areas around the world , we are reacting too late to a cold war crisis where the cause of freedom is in serious trouble ; in Cuba , where Communists openly plot the disruption of hemispheric security ; in Ghana , whose President was assailed by Mr. Herter last week as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc ; in Japan , where the anti-American demonstrations have recently been mentioned - in the area known as Indochina , where the tiny nation of Laos is struggling to keep its head above a Communist tide - in Poland , where the once hopeful cracks in the Iron Curtain seem to be gradually disappearing - and in India , where the one nation capable of surpassing China for the economic leadership of the Asian continent is meeting one setback after another . These six areas are far apart in their geography , their history , their devotion to freedom and the kind of threat their situations now pose .

These people will feel they have no chance , and then , of course , they will listen to Castros . So I would suggest that the United States try to develop again the spirit of the good neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt , that we regard this as the first line of defense , that we bring in students , that we broadcast in Spanish to Cuba and all of Latin America , that we tell our story , that we help them distribute their agricultural products and resources , and maintain their economy and provide a gradual increase in the standard of living for each person . This is the key to Latin America .

But the American people can not afford many more such experiences . For the transformation of Cuba into a Communist base of operations a few minutes from our coast - by jet plane , missile , or submarine - is an incredibly dangerous development to have been permitted by our Republican policymakers . Havana - once a city bursting with admiration for Franklin Roosevelt , the good neighbor - is now a center of Communist press , propaganda , and broadcasts spreading anti-Yankee sentiment throughout Latin America .

In cutting off a carefully limited number of the American goods which can be sent to Cuba Mr. Nixon has made a dramatic but almost empty gesture - a gesture which will have so little impact on Castro as to be almost meaningless . The State Department itself admits that our exports to Cuba have already declined by more than 50 percent since Castro took power . This latest move merely accelerates and aids a long-standing Castro policy - a policy which the State Department itself recognized in its statement this morning - a policy of eliminating all Cuban dependence on American goods , shifting Cuban trade to the Communist bloc

The Government said this mine was no longer needed . They admitted that cobalt was essential - they admitted we needed a safe supply - but they said we would be able to get all the cobalt we needed from such friendly countries as Cuba and the Congo . They were wrong about Cuba - they were wrong about the Congo

There is resentment against the so-called colossus of the north , resentment which one could understand if we were in the same position , I am sure . Now , as far as our program toward Cuba is concerned though I would say that , from what I have learned , from talking to some Latin American leaders and from the reports I have read from our diplomats who have talked to Latin American leaders in other countries , they applaud what the United States has been doing toward Castro , by the strength that we have shown , the fact that we have not thrown our weight around in a way that many would have thought would have been unreasonable . **They feel we were correct , I think , the majority of them , in acting as we did with regard to the sugar , the taking away of special consideration that we had with regard to sugar .** They thought that was justified in view of the Cuban Government 's expropriation of much of our property , but I think our present course in Cuba has not lost us friends in Latin America . If anything , it has gained us friends .

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[Cheers and applause .] And then , three , we have the lesson in Cuba , here again the President , with great statesmanship , saying he will contain Mr. Castro ; we will contain him economically and politically , Senator Kennedy saying No ' ; we 've got to go further , and then shooting from the hip , advocating direct Government intervention , in effect , and it was interpreted that way all over the free world , in the affairs of Cuba . What would that have done ? It would have decimated the people of that island .

You have developed the technique of having your writers rewrite my statements , using those rewritten statements and attacking me for things I have never said or advocated . This is certainly the record with regard to the speeches you have been making in the past 45 hours on Cuba . I have never advocated and I do not now advocate intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obligations and in fact stated in Johnstown , Pa .

Africa could determine if I make itself free . Cuba could change . All these things could move in one direction or another in the next 45 years .

I realize that line is subject to criticism , because we have a very difficult situation ; but to those who do criticize what we are doing my answer , of course , is : What is the alternative ? There are those who say , Why do n't we send Marines to Cuba ? We could do it and we could give it to Mr. Castro in 24 hours , but getting rid of Castro in Cuba would not get rid of Castroism in Cuba or in Latin America and it would set in motion , in my opinion , a chain reaction of opposition to the United States through the other Latin American countries , which could be very , very detrimental to our foreign policy . That 's why I think the United States , with its great power , has to continue to treat Cuba , as it has , with consideration , always patient , working with our other friends in Latin America , to be sure that they will support our position toward Castro and toward his close association with communism in Cuba . I would add one other thing ; I think that Mr. Castro 's very close identification with Mr. Khrushchev at the U.N. will not help him in Cuba .

As a matter of fact , this talk about the fact that Cuba is lost and that Ghana is lost , and Guinea is lost , incidentally - and they have also claimed that - is irresponsible in the extreme . Cuba is not lost . The fact that Castro , of course , is following a pro-Communist line at the present time causes us great concern , but there are plenty of things that we can do and are doing , and we 're taking some very firm steps , as you know , to quarantine Castro in that area .

In every one of these three instances , do you see what would have happened if he had been President ? In Quemoy and Matsu , it might have meant war or it might have meant surrender . In Cuba , it might have meant war , by inviting the Communists in - civil war , which we could n't stay out of . And in Paris - the U-2 flights - it would have meant certainly surrender of principle , and it would have encouraged Mr. Khrushchev to beat him to a pulp , because that 's the only thing he understands .

It 's been done , incidentally , over the objection of some well-intentioned , but hopelessly naive Castro apologists within the United States - and all that I can say with regard to Senator Kennedy 's position is that he apparently is attempting to obscure his association with the views of this pro-Castro group as indicated in the book that I mentioned a moment ago or he must have thought now that there would be political advantage in taking a stronger position than I have taken , a radical position , instead of the strong and sound position that the administration has taken . And , so , what does he suggest ? He comes up , as I pointed up , with the fantastic recommendation that the U.S. Government shall directly aid the anti-Castro forces both in and out of Cuba . Now , every freedom-loving person in the United States - let 's make it clear - is in sympathy with the democratic anti-Castro forces in Cuba and outside Cuba .

I realize that line is subject to criticism , because we have a very difficult situation ; but to those who do criticize what we are doing my answer , of course , is : What is the alternative ? There are those who say , Why do n't we send Marines to Cuba ? We could do it and we could give it to Mr. Castro in 24 hours , but getting rid of Castroism in Cuba would not get rid of Castroism in Cuba or in Latin America and it would set in motion , in my opinion , a chain reaction of opposition to the United States through the other Latin American countries , which could be very , very detrimental to our foreign policy . That 's why I think the United States , with its great power , has to continue to treat Cuba , as it has , with consideration , always patient , working with our other friends in Latin America , to be sure that they will support our position toward Castro and toward his close association with communism in Cuba . I would add one other thing ; I think that Mr. Castro 's very close identification with Mr. Khrushchev at the U.N. will not help him in Cuba .

But what I do suggest is that at least we have some concern , some recognition , some idea of the changing nature of our times . The whole problem in Cuba is not a dialogue about Mr. Castro . The whole problem in Cuba is what is going to happen in the rest of Latin America , whose side is going to be successful in those areas , which system offers the hope to these people .

And on the other side there is the wrong and demagogic way - the right that I have pointed out , the wrong which Senator Kennedy has advocated - and I say this is a way of shooting from the hip on matters gravely affecting the security of the United States . And , so , finally , let 's look at the record , all three , the position on Quemoy and Matsu - slice off a bit of freedom , maybe it will lead to peace ; the position on the summit conference - express regrets to Khrushchev ; maybe we can save the conference , and then this latest episode with regard to Cuba . I think when you look at these three episodes that this would convince many Americans that they could not do well at night with a man with such a total lack of judgment as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces in this critical period .

As a matter of fact , this talk about the fact that Cuba is lost and that Ghana is lost , and Guinea is lost , incidentally - and they have also claimed that - is irresponsible in the extreme . Cuba is not lost . The fact that Castro , of course , is following a pro-Communist line at the present time causes us great concern , but there are plenty of things that we can do and are doing , and we 're taking some very firm steps , as you know , to quarantine Castro in that area .

I say in that connection that with all the criticism of President Eisenhower 's administration , they ca n't take away the fact that under his leadership we got the United States out of one war ; we 've kept her out of other wars , and we do have peace without surrender today . Yes , there are problems , problems like the one in Cuba that my opponent is discussing tonight without offering any solution for , and , incidentally , may I say , looking at that problem , I will have more to say about that at a later time , and he had better look to the record of his administration before he starts criticizing ours in that field . He talks about dictators , and I can only say that the number of dictators we inherited from the Truman administration is far greater than the number we have today in Latin America , and that 's something he must remember .

I was in Cuba in 1957 and the American Ambassador informed me that the American Ambassador was the second most influential man in Cuba . There is not any doubt we had great influence in Cuba , and I think it is unfortunate that we did not use that influence more vigorously to persuade Mr. Batista to hold free , open elections , so that the people of Cuba could have made the choice , rather than holding onto his power and finally driven out by Castro at the point of a gun . Mr. Castro is now a Communist .

Fifth , I have tried in this campaign to address myself to the real issues confronting America - the real issue is world freedom or world slavery . World peace or world war , stopping the Communist advance which in 8 years has penetrated deep into Asia , Africa , the Middle East and Latin America - taking over Cuba itself - without firing a single shot or losing a single soldier . That is the real issue . I say that the greatest objective is peace because I know something of war .

It is true , as you stated in your telegram , that I said that I intended to talk about Quemoy and Matsu every day for the final 3 weeks of the campaign . What I said that I had no idea that you would make even a greater blunder about Cuba . Consequently , I will talk about not only Quemoy and Matsu but also about Cuba every day during the next 2 weeks - I will do this because I am deeply concerned about the policies you advocate in those two areas of the world which might well lead to abandoning free territory in the Far East , and a loss of all of our Latin American allies in this hemisphere or worse .

And the young men and women , those who are students , those who teach them , those who represent the intellectual vitality of these countries , began to look to the United States as a dynamic country which carried with it a hope for a better life for people all over the world . Should we be astonished at what is happening in the Congo today when they have less than a handful , probably less than 14 , college graduates in the whole country ? When there is no officer who is a Negro who is native in any of their armed forces ? Do you think that a country can manage a system as sensitive as democracy when it does not have the chance to educate its people ? In Laos , Cambodia , the Congo , and Cuba we have seen in the last few years the tide turn against us . But I do not concern myself with the feeling that the decline of the United States has set in. This is a great country .

Now , before we go into this question , many people will say , But , Mr. Nixon , are you for Castro ? Do n't you think we ought to support the people that are against him ? The question is not whether you 're for or against Castro . The question is : What do you do ? What can you properly do ? What can the great United States of America legally and properly do to help the people of Cuba get the kind of government they deserve ? And this is n't easy . It is n't the easy shooting-from-the-hip way that Senator Kennedy has suggested .

And , worse still , it would have meant surrender at the conference table . And then the third instance , the instance of Cuba - here again shooting from the hip , but not in the Texas fashion , because he missed the mark completely [cheers and applause] shooting from the hip and , rather than following the President , who said we 'll handle this fellow , Castro , within our treaties by quarantining him economically and politically , he said : No; no. We 've got to go further than that . We 've got to break our treaties - and he did n't say that but that 's the way everything was interpreted .

[Applause .] I have asked Mr. Nixon to participate in a fifth debate which I think should cover the question of Cuba and other important problems facing the American people . I still find it impossible to understand why Mr. Nixon wants to limit the debate to one subject where there are so many important problems facing the American people .

I do n't take the views that the only alternative to a dictator is a Communist dictator . If the United States had just had its influence , and at that time the United States was extremely powerful in Cuba , it seems to me we could have persuaded Mr. Batista to hold free elections at the time he was permitted to go and permit the Cuban people to make their choice instead of letting Castro seize power through revolution . I think we are going to have a good deal of trouble in the future with Castro through all of Latin America .

Oh , the problems are great . In Cuba , in the Congo , in the Near East , all over the world , there are problems with which we are confronted and we will continue to be confronted with them in the years ahead . But the opportunities are even greater .

Major policy on issues such as Cuban security is made at the highest levels - in the National Security Council and elsewhere - and it is the party in power which must accept full responsibility for this disaster . The story of the transformation of Cuba from a friendly ally to a Communist base is - in large measure - the story of a government in Washington which lacked the imagination and compassion to understand the needs of the Cuban people - which lacked the leadership and vigor to move forward to meet those needs - and which lacked the foresight and vision to see the inevitable results of its own failures . And it is a tragic irony that even while these policies of failure here were being pursued our policymakers received repeated and urgent warnings that international communism was becoming a moving force behind Mr. Castro and the revolution - that our interest and the interests of freedom were in danger - that a new Soviet satellite was in the making .

He must never be rash or impulsive . That 's why President Eisenhower has followed a policy with regard to Cuba , of quarantining them diplomatically and economically , rather than a policy advocated by some of direct Government intervention in that country . The latter policy sounds good , but the President knew that if he did that , that he would lose , in effect , our allies and friends throughout the world .

Secondly , also before the threat reached that stage , each of these areas had been visited by Mr. Richard Nixon . Why was not our Latin American capital investment program strengthened in 1958 , after Mr. Nixon was there , instead of this summer at the point of Mr. Castro 's gun ? Why did we not encourage free elections in Cuba after Mr. Nixon was there in 1955 , in order to stave off a revolt against what he called in a Havana press conference in 1955 the competence and stability of the Batista dictatorship ? Why are we suddenly embarking now on a crash program for African scholarships for students ? Last year we allocated no scholarships at all to the Congo , practically none to other French and Belgian colonies and , indeed , practically none to the continent of Africa itself . We have allocated more scholarships this summer to the Congo than we allocated to all of Africa a year ago .

For we have not only supported a dictatorship in Cuba - we have propped up dictators in Venezuela , Argentina , Colombia , Paraguay , and the Dominican Republic . We not only ignored poverty and distress in Cuba - we have failed in the past 8 years to relieve poverty and distress throughout the hemisphere . For despite the bleak poverty that grips nearly all of Latin America - with an average income of less than $ 285 a year - with an exploding population that threatens even this meager standard of living - yet our aid programs have continued to concentrate on wasteful military assistance until we made a sudden recognition of their needs for development capital practically at the point of Mr. Castro 's gun .